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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
siders illegal cannot be prosecuted under the Sherman Act, the Hobbs
Act may acquire a greater significance than it would have otherwise.
It may be that henceforth the predominant question to arise in an
analysis of the wrongful activities of labor will no longer be whether
or not there was a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, but rather
whether or not there was robbery or extortion in interstate commerce
as defined in the Hobbs Act.
WMLIAM B. AYcocK.
Aviation-Liability of Airport for Low Flying-Flights Through
Airspace as Taking of an Easement
With the end of World War II, there has been a great advance in
the field of commercial aviation both on a national and international scale.
This in turn will bring about an increasing amount of litigation over
problems incident to air commerce, and result in further development of
a body of law peculiar to this type of commerce.
A case of interest in this field was recently decided by the United
States Supreme Court,1 and although the case arose out of facts created
by war conditions, the decision is significant as our highest court's first
holding on a problem which will be present as long as we have airports
and aircraft. That problem is the proper adjustment of the conflicting
rights of adjacent landowners and airport operators.
This particular case was an action by one Causby against the United
States for an alleged taking by the defendant of the plaintiff's home
and chicken farm which was adjacent to the Greensboro, North Caro-
lina, municipal airport, leased by the defendant for use as an Army and
Navy air base. The taking complained of was caused by frequent flights
of government aircraft at low altitudes while taking off and landing.
The noise of the planes, and the glare of the landing lights at night
made it impossible to use the land as a chicken farm, and the Court of
Claims found that the plaintiff's property had depreciated in value as a
result of this, and held that the United States had taken an easement
in the airspace from the commencement of the lease, the value of which
was $2,000.00.2 The Supreme Court sustained the Court of Claims as
to the taking of an easement for which plaintiff should be compen-
sated,3 but reversed the case in order that the nature of the easement
I United States v. Causby, 326 U. S. -, 66 Sup. Ct. 1062, 90 L. ed. 971
(1946). (Justices Black and Burton dissenting.)
'Causby v. United States, 60 F. Supp. 751 (Ct. Cl. 1945). (Judge Madden
dissenting.)
This was not a taking of an easement by prescription, but an implied taking
giving rise to a suit under the Tucker Act [24 STAT. 505 (1887), 28 U. S. C.
§250(1) (1940)] which gives jurisdiction to the Court of Claims for actions against
the United States ". . . founded upon the Constitution of the United States, .
not sounding in tort. . . ." However, it would seem possible in the light of this
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as to permanency could be more clearly determined and it could be de-
cided whether the award made was proper.
4
The legal basis for the decision is not new, for as the law of airspace
rights has developed in this c6untry, the general rule seems to be that
the landowner's rights to the surface are subject to the public right of
flight in the airspace above so long as it does not interfere with the
effective use of the surface. 5 Under this theory repeated flights over the
land of another at such low altitudes as to be dangerous to the health
and life of the owner have been held to constitute a nuisance, and this
is true though such low flights are necessary in order to use an adjoin-
ing airport.6 However, unless actual damage to the property is shown
decision that if the low flights continued for the prescriptive period, the landowner
would be without remedy. This is distinguishable from the negative easement of
light and air which has never been recognized in this country. See 4 TANY,
REAL PROPERTY (3rd ed. 1939) §1194 and cases there cited; also Lindly v. Bank,
115 N. C. 553, 20 S. E. 621 (1894). Tiffany recognized that the taking of an ease-
ment by frequent flights over one's land would present difficulties since the flights
of necessity would have to vary as to linear speace and altitude, but goes on to
say: "But whether such reasons are sufficient to preclude in all cases the acquisi-
tion of a prescriptive right of way through the airspace is, it seems, doubtful." Id.
§1203. But see Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 F. (2d) 755, 759 (C. C. A.
9th, 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S. 654, 81 L. ed. 864, 57 Sup. Ct. 430 (1937)
(where the court says "... . it is not legally possible for appellees to obtain an
easement by prescription through the airspace above the appellants' land").
'The Court of Claims found that the easement was permanent saying: "... that
upon the expiration of its current lease, defendant no doubt intended to make
some sort of arrangement whereby it could use the airport for its military planes
whenever it had occasion to do so." 60 F. Supp. 751, 758. This language was
looked at as conjecture, and it would seem justly so for the United States would
hardly be expected to pay for an easement over the adjoining land after the lease
of the airport had expired. The present case is not the first claim which has
been made against the government for damages due to low flying army planes.
In Decision of the Comptroller General, 3 Comp. Gen. 234, 1928 U. S. Av. Rep.
46 (Washington, 1923), a claim for damages due to frightening cattle by a low
flying army plane was denied where no negligence was shown. This is in accord
with the general rule that there can be no recovery for fright induced in an animal
which spends itself in the animal as is seen in Nebraska Silver Fox Corp. v.
Boeing, 1932 U. S. Av. Rep. 164 (D. C. D. Neb. 1931) where no recovery was
allowed for fright to plaintiff's silver foxes allegedly caused by defendant's low
flying planes and resulting in their aborting their young. However, when the
negligence of the defendant in flying his dirigible below the statutory minimum
was alleged to have frightened plaintiff's horses resulting in injury to plaintiff it
was held that there was good cause of action. Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire and
Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (D. C. N. D. Ohio, 1929). These cases are some-
what similar to the principal case in that it involved the frightening of the plain-
tiff's chickens; however, the recovery here was not the damage to the business
for the loss of the chickens, but for the special value of the land due to its adapt-
ability for use for this business.
'This is the theory set out by the Uniform Aeronautics Act which has been
adopted in whole or in part by 22 states. See UNFoRm AERONAUncS ACT, §§3,
4, 11 U. L. A. North Carolina adopted both of these sections verbatim; N. C.
GEN. STAT. (1943) §§63-12, 63-13, and the Supreme Court recognizes that the
holding that there is a taking here is in accord with the local law of North Caro-
lina as set out in these statutes.
"Delta Air Corp. v. Kersey, 193 Ga. 862, 20 S. E. (2d) 245, 140 A. L. R.
1352 (1942) (where the facts were very similar to the present case in that the
airport runway was so aligned that planes had to pass at low altitudes over plain-
tiff's house in landing and taking off, and the court reversed a nonsuit for in-
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as a result of the low flights, no relief will be granted,7 except where
continued flights at altitudes less than the statutory minimum altitude
are considered trespasses, and then injunction and nominal damages will
be granted even though no actual damage is present." After low flights
have been going over the property for some time, the landowner will be
enjoined from erecting spite structures which interfere with the flights
and are dangerous to the occupants of the planes,0 but he cannot be
enjoined from using his land in a proper manner, and thus a power com-
pany -could not be prevented from erecting power lines on their land
adjoining an airport. 10 An airport will not be considered a nuisance
per se, and no relief will be granted where the suit is brought in an-
ticipation of a nuisance arising from the construction of an airport near
the property of the plaintiff." It may, however, become a nuisance if
not operated in a proper manner.12 Thus the result of the present case
is in accord with existing principals, for the frequent passage of gov-
ernment planes over the land so interfered with its existing use that it
depreciated in value, and this should entitle the owner to compensation
whether it be on the theory that the flights are a nuisance or that they
constitute a taking of an easement in denial of constitutional rights.13
junction and damages against the city of Atlanta on the theory that such low
flights would constitute a nuisance and thus interfere with the owner's use of Pis
land). Vanderslice v. Shawn, 27 A. (2d) 87 (Del. Ct. Ch. 1942) (where the
low flights over the plaintiff's land were enjoined when they interfered with the
"existing use" of the land).
Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817 (1934) (where the
court said mere apprehension of injury from the low flights was not enough to
give a right to recover).
S Burnham v. Beverly Airways, 311 Mass. 628, 42 N. E. (2d) 575, 135 A. L. R.
750 (1941); Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385,
69 A. L. R. 300 (1930). The Burnham case recognizes that it is not in accord
with the nuisance doctrine, where there is a right until it actually interferes with
the existing use of the property. The view of these cases is recognized in the
Restatement of Torts (1938) §159, comment e, and §194. There would seem to
be little reason for calling flights across a person's land at altitudes below stat-
utory minimum in order to take off and land, trespasses and enjoining them
unless there was some injury to the surface, particularly in the light of the public
nature of aviation in these times. Thus the Massachusetts view would seem to
besomewhat out of line with the law of most jurisdictions.
' United Airport Co. v. Hinman, 1940 U. S. Av. Rep. 1 (U. S. D. C. S. D. Cal.
1939); Penn. ex rel. Schnader v. Bestecki, 1937 U. S. Av. Rep. 1 (Ct. Comm.
Pleas, Dauphin County, Pa., 1937); Tucker v. Iowa City, 1936 U. S. Av. Rep.
10 (D. C. Johnson County, Iowa, 1935).
" Guith v. Consumer's Power Co., 36 F. Supp. 21 (E. D. Mich. 1940) ; Capital
Airways v. Indiana Power and Light Co., 215 Ind. 462, 18 N. E. (2d) 776 (1939).
'Warren v. City of Detroit, 308 Mich. 460, 14 N. W. (2d) 134 (1944);
Batchellor v. Commonwealth, 176 Va. 109, 10 S. E. (2d) 529 (1940).
2 See note 6 supra; 2 C. J. S. Aerial Navigation, §29.
"'The dissenting opinion of Justice Black (326 U. S. - -, 66 Sup. Ct.
1062, 1069, 90 L. ed. 971, 978) takes the view that this is not the taking of prop-
erty in a constitutional sense, but a suit in tort for damages due to a nuisance and
thus the Court of Claims was without jurisdiction. (See note 3 supra.) This
year Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act, part 3 of which gives the
federal district courts jurisdiction, sitting without jury, to hear and adjudge
any claim against the United States for money only, arising ". . . on account of
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Since such an easement of flight has been recognized as a property in-
terest in eminent domain proceedings by the Federal Government,' 4 the
holding that it is also protected by the Fifth Amendment' 5 seems log-
ically to follow.
Since an increasing number of airports are now owned by either
municipal or county governments, 16 the decision in this case creates a
new remedy for the landowner adjoining these airports, for if damages
can be shown to his property by low flying planes he may be able to
prove a taking entitling him to compensation under the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 7 whereas in the past he has been limited to suit on either
the nuisance18 or trespass 0 theories. The fact that the airports are
owned by the city or county, however, gives them certain remedies for
protecting the airport approaches which can prevent a suit of this nature
ever arising; for since it is generally held that the operation of an air-
port by a city or county is for a public purpose,20 or even in the nature
of a public utility,2 ' certain rights accrue to them which would not
ordinarily be given to a privately owned airport.
The first and obvious remedy to prevent suits of this nature would
be to acquire enough land by purchase or eminent domain proceedings
damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment.. . " The act also
provides for appeal either to the circuit court of appeals or the Court of Claims
by the losing party. Chap. 753, Public Law 601, Title IV, United States Code
Congressional Service, Advance Sheet No. 6 (1946). Under this law it would
seem that should a person wish to bring a suit of this nature against the Fedeial
Government he could bring it either under the theory of the principal case or
merely as a suit in tort for damages under the nuisance theory. If it were brought
under the latter theory, however, he would be- limited to damages, for the consent
to be sued is for money only, and this would not include injunctive relief.
"United States v. 357.25 Acres of Land, 55 F. Supp. 461 (W. D. La. 1944)
(where the government recognized that such an easement existed as a property
right by bringing condemnation proceedings to procure an easement of navigation
above 25 feet over property adjoining an airport). In this case all compensation
was denied the landowner, since there was already a zoning ordinance which
restricted the use of the land above 25 feet and thus the property owner suffered
no further damage from the condemnation of the easement.
" UN TED STATES COST. AMEND. V.
1 8Rhyne, ARPORTS AND THE CouRTs, National Institute of Municipal Law
Officers, (1944) Chap. I-III.17 U. S. CosT. AMEND. XIV, §1.
19 See note 6 supra.
19 See note 8 supra.
SKrenwinkle v. City of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. (2d) 611, 51 Pac. (2d) 1098 (1935);
People ex rel. Curren v. Wood, 391 IIl. 237, 62 N. E. (2d) 809 (1945) ; Wichita
v. Clapp, 125 Kan. 100, 263 Pac. 12 (1928); Dysart v. City of St. Louis, 321 Mo.
514, 11 S. W. (2d) 1045 (1928); Heese v. Rath, 249 N. Y. 436, 164 N. E. 342
(1928) ; Turner v. Reidsville, 224 N. C. 42, 29 S. E. (2d) 211 (1944) ; Airport
Authority v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 1, 36 S. E. (2d) 803 (1946); Clintock v. City of
Roseburg, 127 Oregon 698, 273 Pac. 331 (1929).
" State v. Johnson, 117 Neb. 301, 220 N. W. 273 -(1928); State v. City of
Cleveland, 26 Ohio App. 265, 160 N. E. 241 (1927) ; Pierce v. Storms, 191 Okla.
410, 130 P. (2d) 523 (1942); and in Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, cited supra note
7, the court speaks of airports as "indispensable public utilities."
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at the initial planning stage so that the airport approaches would be pro-
tected and there would never be any question of interference with the
adjoining landowners. There are a great number of cases upholding
municipalities' right to condemn land under eminent domain proceedings
for the purpose of building airports on the theory that it is for a public
use,22 and this is expressly authorized by statute in some jurisdictions. 2
As a practical matter this may not work out, though, for acquisition of
complete title to land adjoining the airport would result in a great deal
of unnecessary expense.
A second, less expensive, and increasingly popular method is merely
to procure the airspace rights above a certain altitude over the adjacent
land by purchase or eminent domain. The latter of these two methods
is exemplified in a proceeding brought by the Federal Government in
Louisiana to acquire such rights over land adjoining an airport which
was being built.2 4 A substantial number of states now provide for this
by statute, either as a general power given to municipalities in addition
to their power to condemn the land for the airport itself,25 or as a part
of a law for zoning the approaches to airports.26  The only difficulty
with this type of remedy is in determining the value of the rights ac-
quired in order to compensate the owner of the land over which the
easement is taken. The result of this type of remedy is similar to the
'2 Burnham v. Mayor and Aldermen of Beverly, 309 Mass. 388, 35 N. E. (2d)
242, 135 A. L. R. 750 (1941) (where a statute gave city the right to establish
municipal airport, but did not expressly give power of eminent domain for this
purpose; the court implied the power to condemn property under general powers
given city to condemn property for any public purpose). See also Howard v.
City of Atlanta, 190 Ga. 730, 10 S. E. (2d) 190 (1940) ; In re Airport of City of
Utica, 134 Misc. 60, 234 N. Y. S. 668 (1929); Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash.
120, 288 Pac. 258 (1930) ; and Central Hanover Bank and T. Co. v. Pan American
Airways, 137 Fla. 808, 188 So. 820 (1939) (where the court allowed a private
corporation to condemn land for use as an air terminal).
2 This is provided for in the Uniform Airports Act, Section 3 of which has
been adopted by Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, South Carolina, and Utah. UNI-
FORm AmoaTs AcT §3, 11 U. L. A. North Carolina expressly provides that an
airport is for a public purpose and that cities have the right to acquire lands for
them by eminent domain. N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §65-5. For a general dis-
cussion of this problem and the laws applicable to different states see Rhyne, op.
cit. supra, note 16, Chap. II; and Hunter and Ulman, Airport Legal Developments
(1942) 13 JOURNAL AIR LAW 116.
2 United States v. 35725 Acres of Land, cited supra note 14.
" Laws Del. 1945, c. 300, §2; CODE OF IOWA (1946) §330.5; GEN. STAT. KAN.
(Corrick, 1945 Supp.) §3-113; MINN. STAT. (1941) §360.28; NEB. R vxsEn Am-
PoRTs Acr (1945) §11(2) ; OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1938) §3939; CODE OF S. C.
(Michie, 1942) §7112-37.
"'CODE OF ALA. (1940) tit. 4, §30; Colo. Laws (1945) c. 4, §8(a) ; ILL. STAT.
ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1942 Supp.) c. 15Y2, §46; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart, 1946 Supp.)
§27.49; REVISED STAT. ME. (1944) c. 21, §15; Laws of Mont. 1945, c. 152,
§19; REVISED LAWS OF N. H. (Rumford, 1942) c. 51, §86; N. M. STAT. ANN.
(1941) §47.210; 23 CoxsoL LAWS OF N. Y. (McKinney, 1946 Supp.) §§355, 356;
N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §63-36; OKLA. STAT. ANN. (1946 Supp.) §3-113; PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1945 Supp.) §1563; Laws of S. D. 1943, c. 2, §9; TENN.
CODE ANN. (Williams, 1945 Supp.) §2726.38; UTAH CODE ANN. (Moore, 1943)




result reached in the principal case, in that after the condemnation pro-
ceedings are complete the landowner is compensated for the right of
flight over his land, and the political subdivision which is operating the
airport acquires an easement for the benefit of the general public.
A third way to protect the approaches to airports and thus in effect
acquire easements over adjoining land is the passage of zoning legisla-
tion restricting the height of structures within certain distances from
the airport. A number of states have passed this type of statute now
as a practical and inexpensive solution to the airport approach problem.27
Statutes of this type do not completely prevent the result reached in the
principal case, however, for it is conceivable that even though the land-
owner complied with the zoning ordinances and did not build a structure
above the maximum height, if the low flights over the land constituted
a nuisance and caused his land to materially depreciate as a result, it
would still seem to constitute a taking under the theory of the principal
case. This would not be so in the second remedy mentioned, for where
there is an outright condemnation of the easement, the owner is com-
pensated for the right of flight over the land, and its interference with
his use of the land and possible nuisance effect would be considered in
determining the amount of compensation he should get for easement.
The fact that these zoning ordinances limit the activity of the landowner
on the surface by limiting the height to which he can build within a
certain distance from the airport in effect places a servitude on the land
which might well be called an easement for the benefit of the general
public. There seem to be no appellate decisions questioning the con-
stitutionality of these statutes, 28 but they would seem to fall within the
" Twenty-six states have passed these statutes. See: CODE OF ALA. (1943
Supp.) tit. 4, §20(14); ARYA.NSAS STAT. (Pope, 1941 Supp.) p. 979; FLA. STAT.
ANN. (1943) §149.10; ILL. STAT. ANN. (Smith-Hurd, 1942 Supp.) c. 153 2, §38
et seq.; IND. STAT. ANN. (Bums, 1943 Supp.) §14-606; LA. GEN. STAT. (Dart,
1946 Supp.) §27.40 et seq.; REvisED STAT. ME. (1944) c. 21, §8 et seq.; ANN.
CODE MD. (1939) Art. 1-A, §58; ANN. LAws MAss. (1945 Supp.) c. 90, §40;
MicH. CODE ANN. (Henderson, 1945 Supp.) §10.251; Miss. CODE ANN. (1942)
§7540; Laws Mont. 1945, c. 152, §19; REVisED LAWS OF N. H. (Rumford, 1942)
c. 51, §78 et seq.; N. M. STAT. ANN. (1941) §47.201 et seq.; 23 CoNsoL. LAWS OF
N. Y. (McKinney, 1946 Supp.) §§355, 356; N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §63-29 et
seq.; OxLA. STAT. ANN. (1946 Supp.), §3-101 et seq.; OaGON CoMpILED LAWS
ANN . (1943 Supp.) §45-505; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1945 Supp.) §1550 et seq.;
Laws of S. D. 1943, c. 2, §1 et seq.; TENN. CODE ANN. (Williams, 1945 Supp.)
§2726.47 et seq.; Laws of Vt. 1945, No. 50; UTAH CODE ANN. (Moore, 1945
Supp.) §4-0-68 et seq.; Laws of Wash. 1945, c. 174, §1 et seq.; Laws of Wis.
1945, c. 235, §59-97; Laws of Wyo. 1941, c. 110. For a discussion of the Model
Airports Zoning Act as adopted in North Carolina, see (1941) 19 N. C. L. Ray.
548.
281 In Mutual Chemdcal Co. v. City of Baltinwre, 1939 U. S. Av. Rep. 11 (Cir.
Ct. Baltimore, 1939) the court held unconstitutional the Maryland zoning act as a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in that
it restricted the use of private property without compensation and was thus a taking
of the property. This case would seem to overlook the fact that airports are
considered to be for a public purpose when operated by a municipality for the
use of the general public (see note 20 supra), and thus the adjoining landowners
would have to yield some rights for public safety and public transportation.
19461
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
same classification as other zoning ordinances which have been upheld
on the basis that they are authorized restrictions on the individual's land
for the benefit of the general public under the police power of the
state. 9 These ordinances do not affect existing structures above the
limited height, since such would be a taking of property without due
process of law, but they generally have a provision that any structure in
the zoned area above the limited height may be condemned and the
owner compensated therefor 30
It is seen then, that the result of the principal case is not one which
is new in our law, for it has been recognized by statute in a majority of
our states that an easement of avigation is a necessity, both to protect
the general public from hazards surrounding airports and to protect
the adjacent landowners from invasions due to low flights over their
land in taking off and landing. It is submitted, however, that litigation
of this type may be avoided in the future by the use of remedies avail-
able to municipalities as agents of the states operating the airports for
a public purpose. Should a similar case arise against the Federal Gov-
ernment, it would now be unnecessary to bring it on the implied taking
theory, for the Federal Tort Claims Act a1 gives the consent of the
Government to be sued in tort, and the litigant could bring his suit on
the theory that the low flights damaged his property as a nuisance.
C. D. HOGUE, JR.
Federal Declaratory Judgments in Disability Insurance Cases-
Determination of Jurisdictional Amount
The federal district courts have jurisdiction of cases involving a
federal question and of diverse citizenship cases only where the "mat-
ter in controversy" exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or
value of $3,000.1
In suits by and against insurance companies under the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act the federal courts are not in accord on the
question of what constitutes the "matter in controversy." The problem
centers around the inclusion or exclusion of future benefits in determin-
ing whether the matter in controversy exceeds $3,000; i.e., shall benefits
due to date of suit only be considered, or shall the value of the matter
in controversy *be determined by benefits accrued plus future benefits,
based on the life expectancy of the insured? Two recent decisions in
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits serve to
illustrate this problem.
" Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114, 71
L. ed. 303 (1926).
a' See note 26 supra.
Si See note 13 supra.
136 STAT. c. 91 (1911), 28 U. S. C. A. §41(1).
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